The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In industrialized economies, especially in Europe, taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices and governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. The aim of this paper is to analyze optimal oil taxation in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. We obtain that in general it is not optimal to distort the oil price paid by …rms with taxes. Extending the model in several ways this result could be reversed depending on environmental considerations and available …scal instruments.
Introduction
The international oil market has been very volatile over the past three decades. In 1999 and 2000 signi…cant increases in oil prices have been observed, due to restrictions in oil supply by OPEC, prompting economic agents to advocate government policies to mitigate the e¤ects of oil price increases by cutting taxes. Figure 1 represents the evolution of gasoline prices with and without taxes [see International Energy Agency (2000)]. We observe that both series follow similar paths; so we can conclude that governments do not seem to react to oil price shocks by using oil taxes strategically. Given that taxes represent a large fraction of oil prices in industrialized economies (especially in Europe), governments have signi…cant scope to use taxes to accommodate oil price shocks. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of oil taxes in small economies that import oil and take as given the international oil price, for example as in Spain. A fundamental question in this framework is, How should oil taxes be set over the long run and over the business cycle? To address this question we combine two di¤erent strands of the literature: the macroeconomic incidence of oil price shocks on one hand and optimal taxation on the other hand.
The e¤ects of energy price shocks on economic activity have long been recognized in the literature. Finn (1991) and Kim and Loungani (1992) focus on the analysis of energy price shocks, …nding that this kind of shocks can contribute to economic ‡uctuations. Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) argue that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming imperfect competition makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) explore implications of considering alternative models of energy use, …nding di¤erent implications for how capital and output respond to permanent di¤erences in energy prices.
The literature on optimal taxation suggests that the government should raise revenue by using the tax instruments with the lowest e¢ciency cost [Diamond and McFadden (1974) ]. Many authors, such as Bizer and Stuart (1987) and Goulder (1994) point out that energy taxes have high e¢ciency cost, which becomes even larger under the imperfect competition assumption [Rotemberg and Woodford (1994) ]. If environmental damage is taken into account, the e¢ciency cost of energy taxes decreases by reducing pollution [Goulder (1994) ].
The framework used in this paper is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy that imports oil. The economy consists of consumers and …rms that behave competitively and a government that …nances an exogenous ‡ow of public spending by using consumption and oil taxes. The government chooses taxes optimally by maximizing welfare and taking as given the behavior of private agents.
We establish that, in general, the government should not distort the oil price paid by …rms with taxes, even when consumption of oil is considered and the government distinguishes between the taxes paid by the households and the …rms. These results also hold over the business cycle: in general, in a small open economy it is not optimal to use oil taxes paid by …rms to accommodate shocks. In such cases, consumption and household oil taxes would be the optimal …scal instruments that the government uses in response to shocks. This result could change depending on environmental issues and available tax instruments.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we present the baseline model of a small open economy that imports oil. In the third section we extend the model assuming that imported oil is also used by households as a consumption good. Finally, in the fourth section we summarize the conclusions.
A simple oil dependent small open economy
Consider a small open economy that needs to import oil to produce. We assume that this economy is small in the sense that its actions do not a¤ect the rest of the world. In particular, the price of oil is taken as given. There are two sources of ‡uctuations in this economy: technology shocks and oil price shocks. The economy is populated by a large number of identical in…nite-lived households and …rms. A constant return to scale technology is available to transform labor (n t ), capital (k t ) and oil (e t ) into output (y t ):
where z t represents an exogenous stochastic productivity shock. Output can be used for consumption (c t ), new capital (k t+1 ), oil purchases (p t e t ), government spending (g t ) and non-oil net exports (tb t ):
where ± is the depreciation rate of capital and p t is the exogenous oil price that follows a given stochastic process. Agents in this economy can buy and sell foreign bonds (b t ) in the international capital market at the international real rate of return (r ¤ t ):
The consumer's problem is to maximize the expected lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint:
is a consumption tax, w t is the wage and r t is the capital rate of return. The …rst-order conditions are:
The representative …rm solves:
where ¿ e t is an oil tax. Marginal productivities equalize input prices:
The government …nances an exogenous ‡ow of government spending (g t ) by using consumption and oil taxes. The government budget constraint is:
A competitive equilibrium is a set of paths of allocations fc t ; n t ; k t+1 ; e t ; b t+1 g, prices fw t ; p t ; r t ; r ¤ t g and policies f¿ c t ; ¿ e t ; g t g that satisfy the following: (i) the allocations fc t ; n t ; k t+1 ; b t+1 g solve consumer problem given fw t ; r t ; r ¤ t g and ¿ c t , (ii) the allocations fn t ; k t ; e t g solve the …rm problem given fw t ; r t ; p t g, z t and ¿ e t , (iii) the government budget constraint holds at each period, (iv) the goods, labor, capital, bonds and oil markets clear.
In the competitive equilibrium the government policies are arbitrary. We now consider a government that chooses its …scal instruments optimally, taking as given the behavior of the private agents. The government problem can be divided in such a way that the optimal allocations can be obtained independently of the policies [see for example Chari and Kehoe (1999) ].
The government solves:
The …rst restriction is the implementability constraint, that is the in…nite horizon household budget constraint where consumer and …rm …rst-order conditions have been used to substitute out prices and policies.
The implementability constraint is included in the objective function in order to solve the government problem easily:
where W (c t ; n t ;¸) = U(c t ; n t ) +¸[U ct c t + U nt n t ], with¸representing the Lagrange multiplier that discounts the implementability constraint. Optimal allocations are the result of maximizing this objective function subject to the feasibility condition:
Given the optimal allocations, we can obtain the taxes that support these allocations as a competitive equilibrium outcome by using the optimal rules of private agents. The consumption tax is obtained combining (4) and (8):
and the oil tax is pinned down from (9) . Because of the time inconsistency problem, we assume that the government can commit itself to follow the optimal …scal policy plan.
The objective function is an increasing function of ¿ c 0 . Therefore the government has incentives to set the initial consumption tax as high as possible. The reason is that ¿ c 0 changes the marginal value of the initial stocks of capital and bonds for the household by rising the e¤ective price of the consumption good, and the individual cannot react to the tax by changing the capital or bond stocks.
Proposition 1
At the optimum the government should not distort the oil price paid by the …rm with taxes f¿ e t = 0g 1 t=0 . Proof. Given that the government objective function is di¤erent at t = 0 from t > 0, the proof must be divided in two stages:
Solving the government problem, we obtain the following …rst-order condition for e t :
Under standard assumptions, interiority can be assured, so W ct 6 = 0, and:
Since optimal allocations must satisfy the competitive equilibrium conditions, (9) and (14) must hold simultaneously. Consequently ¿ e t = 0; for all t > 0:
2) t = 0.
Solving the government problem, we obtain the following …rst-order condition for e 0 :
Rearranging:
As we have discussed above, the government has incentives to set an initial consumption tax as high as possible, and:
Then, as in the …rst stage, it follows that ¿ e 0 = 0:
The result presented above implies that the government should not tax oil purchases not only not in the long run, but also not in the short run, because is not optimal to use oil taxes in response to shocks 1 . Therefore, proposition 1 does not support the claims of private agents in many European countries that advocate for cuts in oil taxes to accommodate changes in the international oil prices.
Proposition 1 is equivalent to the result on intermediate good taxation of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) insofar as oil can be reinterpreted as an intermediate good in this economy. This result implies that the tax on intermediate goods should be zero since an optimal tax system must maintain aggregate production e¢ciency.
Proposition 2
In the presence of externalities, the optimal oil tax could be di¤erent from 0.
Proof. We assume that the use of oil reduces welfare. We therefore introduce oil as a negative externality into the utility function:
with U e t < 0:
Proceeding as above, we obtain an objective function that depends also on oil: W (c t ; n t ; e t ;¸): Solving the government problem with this speci…cation of the utility function yields the following …rst-order conditions on oil:
Comparing with the …rst order condition (9) it follows that ¿ e t 6 = 0 for all t¸0:
This proposition explains the existence of optimal oil taxes when environmental damage is considered. The oil tax acts as a pigouvian tax in the sense that attempts to correct the negative externality. Optimal taxes involve a compromise between the positive e¤ect of oil in the production function and the negative e¤ect in the utility function, so as both e¤ects are equal at the margin (see Baumol and Oates (1988) for a general reference).
Household oil consumption
We extend the model assuming that imported oil (e t ) is used not only by …rms (e f t ) as an input, but also by households (e h t ) as a consumption good:
We allow the government to tax e f t and e h t at rates ¿ f t and ¿ h t , respectively. Solving the …rm problem, we set marginal productivities equal to prices:
Now the consumers also obtain satisfaction from the consumption of oil. The consumer's problem is to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint:
The conditions that solve the consumer's problem are:
The government …nances public spending using consumption and oil taxes:
Finally market clearing requires:
A competitive equilibrium is a set of paths of allocations fc t ; n t ; k t+1 ; e h t ; e f t ; b t+1 g, prices fw t ; p t ; r t ; r ¤ t g and policies f¿ c t ; ¿ h t ; ¿ f t ; g t g that satisfy the following: (i) the allocations fc t ; n t ; e h t ; k t+1 ; b t+1 g solve consumer problem given fw t ; r t ; r ¤ t ; p t g and f¿ c t ; ¿ h t g, (ii) the allocations fn t ; k t ; e f t g solve the …rm problem given fw t ; p t ; r t g, z t and ¿ f t , (iii) the government budget constraint holds at each period, (iv) the goods, labor, capital, bonds and oil markets clear.
The government problem is solved following the strategy described in the previous section, that is, by dividing the problem in such a way that optimal allocations are obtained independently of policies.
U (c t ; e h t ; n t ) s:t :
When the implementability constraint is included into the objective function, the allocations are obtained by solving:
s:t :
where W (c t ; n t ;¸) = U(c t ; n t ) +¸[U ct c t + U nt n t + U e h t e h t ]: In next subsections we study optimal taxation for two di¤erent cases: the case of di¤erent taxes on oil (¿ h t 6 = ¿ f t ) and the case of uniform taxation on oil (¿ h t = ¿ f t ).
Di¤erentiated oil taxes
Given optimal allocations, the taxes that support these allocations as a competitive equilibrium outcome are obtained by using the optimal rules of private agents. The consumption tax is obtained combining (18) and (21):
and household oil tax is pinned down combining (18) and (22):
and …nally, …rm oil tax is obtained from (19).
Proposition 3
In the optimum the government should not distort the oil price paid by the …rm with taxes f¿ f t = 0g 1 t=0 .
Proof. Similar to proof in proposition 1.
Adding household oil consumption to the model does not change proposition 1, and the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) result still holds. Moreover, under the assumption that government can distinguish between oil taxes paid by consumers and …rms, it is optimal to tax oil only as a consumption good. Consumption and household oil taxes would be the …scal instruments that the government uses in response to shocks.
Proposition 4
If utility is weakly separable between consumption goods fc t ; e h t g and labor fn t g and is homothetic in consumption, then consumption and household oil taxation is uniform in the sense that optimal taxes satisfy ¿ Proof. Combining equations (28) and (29) we obtain:
where ¹ t represents the Lagrangian multiplier on the aggregate resource constraint. Combining equations (33) and (34) we obtain:
Finally, using equation (31):
Under the assumptions of proposition 4, the government would tax consumption and household oil at the same rate across time. This proposition re ‡ects the validity of the classic result on uniform commodity taxation of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) in the dynamic stochastic setting we consider.
Uniform oil taxes
In this subsection household and …rm oil are forced to be taxed at the same rate (¿ h t = ¿ f t = ¿ e t ). Competitive equilibrium conditions in which taxes are involved represent an incomplete tax system [see Chari and Kehoe (1999) ] in the sense that we have more equations than …scal instruments. These equations are:
and the …scal instruments are (¿ c t ; ¿ e t ). An incomplete tax system implies that a new condition on the allocations must hold to implement it as a competitive equilibrium outcome. This condition is obtained by combining equations (37) and (38):
Equation (39) represents the competitive equilibrium condition that equates marginal rate of substitution between oil and leisure with marginal rate of technical substitution between oil and labor, representing the compatibility between household and …rm plans. So equation (39) must be added as a restriction into the government problem:
Proposition 5 In this economy with an incomplete tax system, optimal oil tax is not zero.
Proof. Solving the government problem, we obtain the following …rst-order condition for e f t : where ¹ t and°t are the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints of the government problem. Comparing these conditions to the …rm oil condition (38), we obtain ¿ e t 6 = 0; for all t¸0: Proposition 6 If the tax system is completed by adding a labor tax, a zero optimal oil tax is found.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyze optimal taxation in oil dependent economies. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that includes oil as an input, we study how oil taxes should be in both the long and the short run. The standard literature points out that energy taxes have greater e¢ciency costs than other kinds of taxes. In a general framework, this result holds, and the government should not distort with taxes the oil price paid by the …rm over the long run or over the business cycle. When environmental damages are considered, this result is reversed and a non-zero oil tax is optimal.
Extending the model by including oil consumption by households, two di¤erent situations arise. When the government can distinguish between oil taxes paid by the household and the …rm, it is optimal to tax the two different uses of oil at di¤erent rates. Thus, whereas the zero taxation result holds for oil used by …rms, the government sets household oil taxes jointly with consumption taxes to raise revenue and to accommodate shocks. Moreover, under suitable assumptions on preferences, the government would tax consumption and household oil at the same rate across time. When it is not possible to tax oil at di¤erent rates, an incomplete tax system problem arises, and it is optimal to distort the oil price paid by the …rm. Otherwise a new tax instrument is required and oil should not be taxed.
